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The growing popularity of the concept of world-class universities raises the question
of whether investing in such universities is a worthwhile use of public resources. Does
concentrating public resources on the most excellent universities improve the overall
quality of a higher education system, especially if definitions of excellence and world-
class are made by external ranking organizations? This paper addresses that question by
developing a framework for weighing up trade-offs between institutional and system
performance, focusing on the potential system-wide improvements which world-class
university programmes (WCUPs) may bring. Because WCUPs are in a relatively early
stage of their development, systemic effects are not yet clear. We therefore analyse the
ex ante reasons that policy makers have for adopting WCUPs to see if they at least seek to
create these systemic benefits.
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The Global Policy Rhetoric on Excellence in Higher Education
The rise of world-class university programmes (WCUPs) has been extensively
documented in the literature, although primarily as an empirical phenomenon (e.g.
Altbach and Salmi, 2011; Shin and Kehm, 2013), in response to an emerging set of
league tables creating institutional rankings of criteria. Some countries that felt
underrepresented in those lists (Ritzen, 2010) created special programmes to
raise national rankings performance by building new universities and upgrade
existing higher education institutions (HEIs). This paper looks at three examples.
France undertook a series of reforms focused on strengthening institutional research
and improving infrastructural quality of the national ‘top universities’ (see Cremonini
et al., 2013). Germany initiated the Excellence Initiative to promote ‘world-class
science’ at German universities. Finland’s Aalto merger broke radically from
earlier higher education policy by creating a ‘world-class university’ (Välimaa,
2012, 27). All these policies specifically emphasized institutional rather than
systemic empowerment1, and in their implementation they were certainly focused
on particular institutions. But at a rhetorical level, the policy makers implied
that improved positioning in some universities in global rankings would
produce wider benefits for the system, for example supporting its international
visibility, investments, recruitment and profile. There is an assumption that resources
spent on higher education are better spent on a few world-class universities
than elsewhere in the system. But there is scant evidence on whether this is
empirically justified.
This paper contributes to emerging debates exploring how higher education
works as systemically converting inputs into desirable outputs. We regard
national policy initiatives targeted on particular universities as only being
efficient insofar as they improve aggregate system outputs (cf. Ederer et al., 2008;
Filippakou et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2012). From this perspective, WCUPs
make a normative claim — that the same amount of public money spent on
select institutions produces a greater public benefit. But at the same time, it is
possible to envisage ways in which WCUPs create system problems, reducing
inclusiveness, accessibility and flexibility (Teichler, 2007 in Kehm and Pasternack,
2009; Kehm, 2013). We therefore seek evidence whether excellence policies
are likely to create systemic improvements or will be dominated by these negative
side effects.
Drawing on the Institute of Higher Education Policy’s (IHEP, 2005) classification
of higher education benefits, we hypothesize that WCUPs could conceivably drive
system upgrading in five areas, attracting external resources, private internal
resources, raising academic standards, creating new programmes and reputational
benefits. But there is a clear dissonance between these potential systems benefits and
institutional improvements necessary to improve individual league table positions,
covering aspects such as institutional research performance. This creates a clear
problem that WCUPs targeting ranking systems might fail to deliver system benefits,
and in this paper, we explore whether policy makers are able to satisfactorily deal
with this system/institution dissonance.
The relative youth of these programmes makes it too soon to observe
these policies’ systemic effects; thus, we focus here on policy makers’ expressed
intentions rather than outcomes. We analyse three countries’ WCUPs in terms
of the programme intentions to identify whether these policies’ implementation
is targeting mainly institutional benefits or rather wider systemic benefits.
Understanding the orientation of policy makers provides a first step in understanding
the broader question of whether WCUPs will improve higher education quality
more generally, and whether they are worth their scarce resources in these
difficult times.
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The Essence of a Good Higher Education System
The idea of a ‘higher education system’ may intuitively refer to a group of
universities in a coherent administrative territory (Filippakou et al., 2012), but we
use the idea more restrictively as a set of interlinked institutions delivering a set of
outputs (see also Collini, 2012, Chapter 1). We begin by defining a good higher
education system as one that maximizes its returns (however defined) by creating
knowledge and ensuring society, in its intrinsic diversity, is served by a populace
with a variety of skills, educated at different yet complementary levels. Thus, the
system should be ‘diverse’ (e.g. through horizontal and vertical differentiation, and
possess mechanisms to support inter-institutional student mobility), and managed on
some level to improve public and private benefits over time.
WCUPs are national schemes supporting individual institutions to enable them to
reward talent, to provide excellent learning and research environments, and to
develop favourable governance features leading to strategic vision, innovation and
flexibility (Salmi, 2009). The goal of WCUPs is to build ‘national champions’ that
might create spill-overs improving the higher education system in its entirety.
Although WCUP support is predominantly financial, it can also take other forms:
creating new legal entities through mergers (e.g. establishing Aalto University— and
the 2006 Danish restructuring of its university and research system, cf. Ministry of
Science, Technology and Innovation of Denmark, 2009, 13) does not necessarily
entail direct public funding.
Higher education confers private and public benefits (IHEP, 2005 for review).
Private economic paybacks are the most evident, including higher salaries, better
working conditions and increased employability (OECD, 2012a). Non-economic
private benefits are just as important, for example increased health, engagement in
society, and life expectancy, while decreasing chances of being a victim of crime or
incarcerated (McMahon, 2009). Research (and valorization) also yields private
benefits — winners of research grants and awards accrue status and reputation that
are intrinsically rewarding and may lead to licensing deals creating jobs or spin-off
companies that produce private profits.
However, universities also produce significant public benefits (McMahon, 2009).
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) (2012a)
calculates that across its 30 member countries, each additional graduate creates a net
$70,000 of public benefits. Public benefits may be economic (e.g. higher tax
revenues, greater productivity, increased consumption, increased workforce flex-
ibility and less reliance on government subventions) or social, such as less crime, and
more social cohesion and democracy. Higher education policy makers are increas-
ingly stressing the university’s wider contribution to socio-economic development
(Sadlak and Cai, 2009, 15; European Commission, 2010; Wildavsky, 2010, 95).
Table 1, taken from IHEP (2005), summarizes higher education’s most important
private and public benefits.
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We use this concept of ‘benefits’ as the starting point for operationalizing a higher
education system as a process converting inputs (e.g. government funding) into
outputs (its benefits). We rationalize public support for HE— in light of the currently
dominant paradigm of new public management in higher education— as being based
on the system’s effectiveness (Bergan et al., 2009) and efficiency (see, inter alia,
Kickert et al., 1997) in producing public benefits. A ‘good’ public intervention
produces these public benefits most efficiently both directly and indirectly
(including public benefits accrued from recycled private benefits such as increased
salaries or additional taxation; see Cremonini et al., 2013 for a broader discussion).
Therefore, a ‘rational’WCUP justifies its public funding by improving the efficiency
of the system in producing its public benefits. Both systems and public benefits
differ, and so the question of the ‘goodness’ of a WCUP is at least partly related to
systemic inefficiencies (despite being inspired by a common rhetoric focused on
rankings).
A Conceptual Framework to Understand the Benefits of World-Class
University Policies
In a recent public lecture, Dirk van Damme, OECD’s Executive Director Centre for
Education Research and Innovation (cited in Cremonini et al., 2013), pointed out
what he called the limits to competition between universities to produce socially
Table 1 The array of higher education benefits
Public Private
Economic Increased tax revenues Higher salaries and benefits
Greater productivity Employment
Increased consumption Higher saving levels
Increased workforce flexibility Improved working conditions
Decreased reliance on government financial
support
Personal/professional mobility
More research and innovation Status/reputation resulting from research
outputs
Financial benefits resulting from research
outputs
Social Reduced crime rates Improved health/life expectancy
Increased charitable giving/community service Improved quality of life of offspring
Increased quality of civic life Better consumer decision making
Social cohesion/appreciation of diversity Increased personal status
Improved ability to adapt to and use technology More hobbies leisure activities
Source: IHEP (2005, p. 4).
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optimal outcomes. The need for increased collaboration between universities to
achieve collective societal ends is a more pressing problem than encouraging
efficiency in quasi-markets. Building on this argument, it is important to consider
these societal benefits produced by the higher education system to understand how a
WCUP creates different outcomes by shifting the system.
We are explicit that we have used here a policy rationality approach which does
not concern itself with ‘political’ considerations that produce normative policy goals
(e.g. conservative vs egalitarian discourses, or seeking symbolic prestige). Our
theoretical underpinning is a ‘means−ends rationality’ whereby resources can be
reallocated to improve outcomes. This paper’s framework emphasizes particularly,
but not solely,2 measurable economic benefits of WCUPs. Although ‘rational’
WCUPs are expected to improve the system’s efficiency by increasing both its
economic and its social benefits (see Table 1), economic measures provide the
most effective way to analyse WCUPs, because of their inherent quantifiability
(in principle).
Indeed, a recurrent justification for WCUPs is that resources concentrated on a
few top institutions are efficient in light of the positive spill-overs for society that will
(it is claimed) ensue. But this argument highlights a public policy problem: while
WCUPs’ private benefits are clear (Salmi, 2009), there is much less evidence that
WCUPs improve the operation of the system as a whole, and there are countervailing
worries that WCUPs might introduce new barriers into national higher education
systems by encouraging competition rather than co-operation (e.g. Teichler, 2007 in
Kehm and Pasternack, 2009; Kehm, 2013). At the same time, the public resources
for WCUPs must be drawn from somewhere, and if they are not at least as
marginally efficient as the current system efficiency, then they will actually reduce
overall system efficiency.
To understand how a WCUP might raise system efficiency, we note that as with
any public funding scheme, efficiency may be regarded in terms of additionality
(i.e. the production of outcomes that would not have happened without the
intervention, Tyler et al., 2009). A good (efficient) WCUP should bring additional
private resources into the higher education system, which are then recycled through
the system and produce additional public benefits creating ‘additionality’. In
Figure 1, adapted from Cremonini et al., 2013, we present this as a systems analysis,
and show that a WCUP can improve the functioning of the system as a whole in
different ways (the black arrows in the figure highlight the points in the higher
education system process where a WCUP is expected to add value, contributing
to the total public benefits). Firstly, it might attract more private funding into
the system. Secondly, it might lead to individual processes within the system
such as the education, the research and the business engagement, functioning
more effectively. Thirdly, these processes might produce greater direct societal
benefits. Fourthly, greater private benefits might be recycled into greater public
benefits (ibid., p. 103)
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We contend that WCUPs can create public value (i.e. additionality) in five areas,
which fit in the system improvement processes presented above:
(1) Increased exogenous resources: the attraction of additional staff, students and
research funding from outside the country/higher education system which spill
over to other HEIs.
(2) Increased private endogenous resources: greater private resources that would
have either not been spent in the country’s universities, or gone to other
universities, go into the sector, which spill-over to other HEIs.
(3) Systemic improvements: the presence of a world-class university improves
the functioning of the higher education system in terms of differentiation
and produces more efficient use of public resources, by for example reducing
drop-out rates.
(4) New products: by creating new globally competitive higher education products
(such as Graduate School trajectories), the sector is more competitive in export
terms, attracting more students as a whole.
(5) Reputational benefits: all national universities benefit from a higher external
awareness/reputation from the presence of one or more world-class institutions in
the system.
Therefore, in this paper our argument is that if WCUPs are to be efficient, they
will have clearly identified and targeted (some of) these system improvement
Education
Research
Business Engagement
Private Funding 
e.g. fees
Public funding
e.g. grants
Total public 
benefits
Private benefits e.g. 
higher earnings
Public sphere
Private sphere
(ii) Increased private  
endogenous resources
(i) Increased exogenous resources 
(iii) Systemic improvements  
(iv) New products 
(v) Reputational benefits 
Figure 1. A systems model of investment in the higher education sector and the possible contribution of
a WCUP in increasing the system’s efficiency.
Source: Cremonini et al (2013).
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benefits. And as we expect a rational WCUP to target these dimensions (or at least
some of them), we propose to classify WCUPs according to how strongly they
promote each of these dimensions. The next sections analyse three university systems
where there have been serious efforts to concentrate resources around WCUPs, and
classify their focus on addressing the five dimensions.
World-Class University Policies In Practice: Three European Cases
Presentation and analysis of the cases
Our concern in this paper is whether WCUPs are an efficient use of public resources,
and ideally this would be undertaken as an ex post comparative analysis. However,
given the relative novelty of WCUP approaches, and the long timescales for
producing these benefits, data is not readily available to definitively answer this
question. Therefore, in this paper, we take a ‘next-best’ approach by considering
these policies’ ex ante intentionality, whether they have been constructed to create
system-wide additionality, or are just targeting institutional benefits, improving the
rankings of a limited sub-set of their universities.
To achieve this, we look at three Continental European countries (Germany,
Finland and France) which adopted WCUPs, and analyse the initial policy intentions,
and in particular how seriously they have targeted each of those five areas of potential
system benefits identified above. These three cases were chosen because all three
countries felt that improving league table positions for their universities was important
to improve their system’s visibility and felt that some form of WCUP was a way to do
this. For each country, we judged the expected impacts in three levels (absent, limited
and core). Because of the study’s exploratory nature (and its consequent focus on
‘intentionality’) we did this through subjective assessment of the policy. The levels
refer to the degree to which implementation is taking place, defined as follows:
● Absent: rhetoric is observed, but implementation effort (e.g. by devoting
resources) is absent or negligible.
● Limited: symbolic arguments and targets are stressed but few resources (especially
funding) are deployed in line with the goals and targets.
● Substantial: coherent priority, objectives, targets and resources are devoted to the
achievement of the policy’s goals.
In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview of each WCUP in its
national context. The data presented here is primarily secondary (cf. Cremonini et al.,
2013; Kehm, 2013) with a specific focus on the intentions and focus of the particular
policy interventions. This has been matched with a degree of analysis of policy
documents from education Ministries, from the involved universities, from press
reports and other sources as referenced. These sources were combined to create
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a single narrative for the national policy intentionality, which was then analysed to
understand policy makers’ intentions in establishing these programmes.
Finland
The key WCUP in Finnish higher education materialized in Aalto University, a large-
scale merger that was part of wider reforms across the sector (Labi, 2011). A number
of institutional mergers have taken place in recent years — some to rationalize the
university network in regions, others to address specific situations or fields of study
(Dobson, 2008).
However, the ‘mega-merger’ of Helsinki School of Economics, University of Art
and Design Helsinki and Helsinki University of Technology, which resulted in
Aalto University, was a conscious effort to promote the international reputation of
Finland’s higher education (cf. Aula and Tienari, 2011). Cited as ‘Finland’s version
of the “Harvard Here” syndrome’ (Dobson, 2008), Aalto university represents a
‘radical change in (traditionally status-free) [Finnish] higher-education policy’
(Välimaa, of the University of Jyväskylä, quoted in Labi, 2011). Moreover, Aalto’s
ambitious fund-raising campaign, backed by generous government subsidies, was
meant to help catapult it to ‘the list of top universities in the world’ (Tawast, director
of the effort, quoted in ibid.).
Aalto’s basic capital of €700 million was accumulated in three stages in 2008,
2009 and 2010 through a State endowment of €500 million and donations worth
€200 million from business, industry and other donors. This endowment would be
additional to its core funding as a public university. The Finnish government
incentivizes corporate donations to HEIs through a tax deduction scheme and these
donations were heavily skewed towards Aalto university, which received about 66%
of the total €318 million (Myklebust, 2012).3
Aalto and other merger programmes complemented the longer-standing
Finnish government Centres of Excellence programme (Academy of Finland, 1997;
Davies et al., 2006), which are inter-institutional initiatives focusing on topical
research (Academy of Finland, 2011).
The Finnish policy on Aalto University was underpinned by three key arguments.
First, it was expected to improve educational infrastructure — particularly for
entrepreneurial training. The mergers were intended to address unmet demand for
higher education in specific fields and should create critical mass for research and
innovation. According to foreign evaluators (Veugelers et al., 2009, 147):
The reform of the Finnish university sector and the creation of Aalto University
present an important and timely opportunity to create world class infrastructure
for entrepreneurial education, training and research accessible to both Finnish
and collaborative foreign interests involved in growth oriented and new
knowledge based enterprise.
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Second, Aalto University was justified in terms of systemic improvements.
Expected efficiency gains include inter alia simpler rules and policies, less over-
lapping in teaching, joint research and joint financial management (Ahonen, 2008).
And: ‘One idea behind the university reform and especially the creation of multi-
disciplinary Aalto University may be seen to better promote innovative entrepreneur-
ship (as well as innovation)’ (Viljamaa and Lahtinen, 2011, 15).
Third, promoting the global reputation of Finland and its higher education system
played an important role. For example, the ministry of Education and Culture (see:
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Koulutus/artikkelit/Innovaatioyliopistohanke/index.html?
lang=en) emphasized:
Aalto University’s special national mission will be to employ research and
education to support the success of Finland in the international economy. At
the same time, the university will make a positive contribution to Finnish
society, its technology, economy, culture and international appeal.
The head of Aalto’s Financial Planning, Ahonen, stressed (2008, slides 9; 25–26):
The national task of the University is to support Finland’s success by means of
high-level research and teaching. The University supports in a positive way the
Finnish society, its technology, economy, culture and international interest
towards it. […] The purpose of this merger is not to save money but to create
and support excellence.4
However, on the other two dimensions of our Framework there are mostly implicit
expectations. For instance, increased exogenous resources such as additional staff and
students were stressed less than efficiency, reputation and more endogenous resources.
Hence, as is shown in Table 2, the strongest claim in Aalto is its role in creating
endogenous resources, systemic efficiency and reputational benefits. Innovative
products are deemed weak because the fact that Aalto itself is a ‘new product’ fits
within an overall reform agenda that does not change the types of education on offer.
The Finnish policies are likely to produce many effects in the long term but
already today attention is being drawn to several trends, such as (see, e.g., Kivistö
and Tirronen, 2012, 80 ff.):
● The increasing vertical stratification among universities.
● The emphasis on non-budget supplementary public and private funding.
● The ‘corporatization’ of universities (i.e. universities as independent legal persons
with more financial responsibility and managerial leadership).
● The increasing diversity in university boards.
● The contractual liability and strategic government steering (e.g. performance
measurement and more emphasis on strategic dimensions).
● The focus on research capacity.
● The strengthening of public-private cooperation.
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France
WCUPs also formed part of France’s broader reform agenda, initially aimed at
reducing inequality of access to the highly selective Grandes Écoles. By late 2007,
its emphasis switched from increasing access to elite institutions to upgrading more
universities to be ‘élite’: reforms under President Sarkozy included the ‘Law on the
Freedoms and Responsibilities of Universities’ (LRU), introducing marketization
and competitiveness in the sector, freeing universities from central government
control, introducing output-based public funding, and holding them accountable
through a new inspection and evaluation apparatus.
The markedly poor performance of French institutions in the first 2003 Academic
Ranking of World Universities triggered key WCUPs in France— a process that ran
Table 2 Assessment of intended benefits, Finland
Dimension Description Assessment
Increased exogenous
resources
Aalto has gained prominence over time, which led, for example,
to new international scholarships being provided (e.g. through
the Fulbright programme).
Absent
Increased private
endogenous
resources
The investments gone into Aalto do show awareness of the public
benefits this initiative can produce. The merger is considered a
unique opportunity to improve educational infrastructure
(particularly for entrepreneurial training). Aalto, as other
mergers in the country, was meant to address an unmet
demand for higher education in specific fields as well as to
create critical mass for research and innovation— with the
intended result that money that would not have been spent in
the higher education system, can be spent in the higher
education system.
Substantial
Systemic improvements The Aalto merger is particular because it was justified by the call
for WCU but it is also typical, being part of larger governance
and funding reforms. The Finnish higher education sector is
undergoing a number of institutional mergers to rationalize the
system (create critical mass, e.g. in sparsely populated areas).
Substantial
New products Aalto is itself a new product but does not change the types of
education on offer. However, it does intend to lead to new
types of research and innovation outputs (more
interdisciplinarity).
Absent
Reputational benefits Intends to be an answer to the ‘Harvard here’ syndrome. It seems
to draw its legitimacy from its international success vis-à-vis
global players not only in academia, but also in private
business (see Hanna-Mari Aula and Janne Tienari; from Aalto
state in their article that ‘the making of the new Aalto
University seemed to draw its legitimacy from success in the
international arena and vis-à-vis global players not only in
academia, but also in private business’).
Limited
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in parallel with the LRU. A new policy of research concentrating and profiling was
introduced starting the mid-2000s (Harfi and Mathieu, 2006), including the Pôles de
recherche et d’enseignement supérieur (PRES [Centres of Research and Higher
Education]), Opération Campus, and the Initiatives d’excellence (IDEX [Excellence
Initiatives]).
The PRESs group a variety of actors and stakeholders (Aust et al., 2008) into
public entities for scientific cooperation (établissements publics de coopération
scientifique, or ECPS), which allow universities to award degrees and other
qualifications separately, while their research work carries the name of the PRES.
By 2011, there were over 20 PRESs involving almost 60 universities, engineering
Grandes Écoles, Institutes of Political Studies, private business schools, public
research institutes and other bodies, alongside research and teaching hospitals.
Opération Campus, launched in early 2008, was mainly justified with the need for
infrastructural refurbishment. Government funding was made available in a competi-
tion. As of late 2011, 12 campuses were selected for improvement. The total
investment amounted to €5.3 billion with Saclay Campus at the peak of the system
with funding for €850 million. Opération Campus expressly sought to transform a
limited number of campuses (and a larger number of universities, as some campuses
are shared by more than one institution) into internationally visible ‘shop-windows’
of French higher education and research excellence.
Third, in late 2010, the Ministry of Higher Education and Research announced
IDEX, which rewards cooperation among universities, Grandes Écoles, and private
sector regarding excellence in research, robustness of management plans and
intensity of linkages between the public and private partners. The funding is of €7.7
billion for 5–10 ‘Excellence Centres’ (Pôles d’excellence).
The French policies are perhaps the clearest example of the aspiration to solve a
systemic problem, namely the segmentation between the élite Grandes Écoles and the
mass universities, through policies seemingly designed to promote institutional
excellence. It was to this segmentation that Valérie Pécresse, then Minister for
Higher Education, ascribed the poor performance of French universities in the first
global university league tables in 2003 (Ritzen, 2010).
The French WCUP was part of an attempt to neo-liberalize the French state, and
included a familiar vocabulary of calls for international standards and global
ambitions. The ‘ARWU crisis’ of 2003 provided the rationale for the state to
intervene. Hence, Operation Campus appeared to develop out of different logics and
rationales without a clear driving ambition, using the ‘excellence card’ as a pretext
for setting off necessary long-term change (though the call for reputational benefits is
very strong indeed).
Moreover, the PRESs are meant to foster sustainable new research centres (i.e.
‘new products’, to use this paper’s framework; cf. also Cremonini et al., 2013, 113).
The desire to increase endogenous and exogenous resources remained limited in
the policy. More foreign students have been studying in French HEIs over the years
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but this is a development that can only partially be attributed to, and justified by,
recent WCUPs (the reforms since the 1990s and the Bologna Process also had to do
with it). Internal resources, on the other hand, have not as yet been flowing
prominently from private funders, even though the French WCUP created an
environment where the government was willing to invest in research, believing it
offered promising returns (Marshall, 2012) (Table 3).
The question of the French WCUPs’ impact to date faces two fundamental
problems. Other than time lag, French higher education policy faced a series of
impasses that led to general activity being often contested, not least because of the
change in presidency in 2012. The new administration instigated a review of the Plan
Campus; a large-scale consultation culminated in a policy report to the Prime Minister
(Le Déaut, 2013). But in late 2012, universities were still vocal in their rejection of the
adverse effects of the reforms. For example, university presidents sent an open letter in
November 2012 to the new Minister pointing out their concerns (see http://www.
sauvonsluniversite.com/spip.php?article5809). In particular, minister Fioraso took
advice from a study into the requirement for all universities and PRESs to engage in
public−private partnerships for the development of new infrastructures. The Peylet
Report advised a more flexible and less dogmatically neo-liberal approach to the
funding of Plan Campus projects, facilitating effectively a ‘re-launch’ in March 2013
of a range of initiatives aimed at improving student success-rates in higher education
and at increasing the national and international ‘attractiveness’ of French universities.
Germany
Breaking with its long-standing belief in a homogeneous university system, in 2005
Germany launched the Excellence Initiative. This policy sought to improve the
international standing of German universities and to provide targeted funding on a
competitive basis to selected (parts of) institutions to enable them to compete on a
global scale and catch up with the world’s leading research universities through three
funding tracks:
● Clusters of excellence (local networks), which should contribute to participating
universities’ strategic planning and to accelerate the process of setting thematic
priorities at universities. Thirty-seven Clusters of Excellence received funding for
5 years, each receiving on average €6.5 million per year. This track did not support
whole universities but certain groups and units.
● Graduate schools: 39 Graduate Schools were selected to receive on average of
€1 million per year, for 5 years. These two tracks covered over 50% of the funding
available in the Excellence Initiative.
● Institutional strategies to promote top-level research (support for excellent
universities as a whole). Nine universities and their Institutional Strategies were
funded for 5 years, with each receiving up to €13.5 million per year.
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In June 2009 the Federal and State governments approved continuing the
Excellence Initiative for another 5 years (2012–2017). A further €2.7 billion in
public funds were put to tender and in June, 45 graduate schools, 43 clusters of
excellence and 11 institutional strategies received endowments see (also for the
official Call in English): http://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/excel-
lence_initiative/general_information/index.html).
The Excellence Initiative has been criticized for its neglect of teaching quality.
Also for this reason, the Stifterverband5 announced its Excellence Initiative for
Teaching worth €10 million (€5 million plus a further €5 million from State coffers),
which ran between 2009 and 2012, but this has been criticized for being insufficient
in relation to the billions for the Excellence Initiative (see Gardner, 2012).
Contrary to Finland and France, Germany has been somewhat of a pioneer
in supporting institutional excellence through a well-targeted policy initiative
Table 3 Assessment of intended benefits, France
Dimension Description Assessment
Increased
exogenous
resources
There has been an increase in the internationalization of
France’s higher education system since the late 1990s (see
Vincent-Lancrin, 2009). But the extent to which WCUPs in
France were intended to contribute to this (in addition to
extant reforms with a national logic as well as those driven
by the Bologna process) is dubious. Arguably, the
internationalization of French higher education was not as
explicit a goal of the WCUPs as, for example, system
improvements and the creation of sustainable mergers.
Absent
Increased private
endogenous
resources
There was an ambition to encourage the inflow of private
resources into the universities to partially fund the
investments in infrastructure from private sources.
Substantial
Systemic
improvements
In France, WCUPs were concerned with (much needed)
university refurbishment and with reducing segmentation
and inequality in participation between selective Grandes
Ecoles and the mass university system.
Substantial
New products In France, most universities have joined into one of the 10
university urban confederations across the country (the
PRESs), into which substantial sums are being invested.
They are public entities for scientific cooperation, which
have a common identity and may award degrees and other
qualifications.
Limited
Reputational benefits The ARWU crisis was clearly a moment that allowed the
government to advance a new administrative paradigm into
the French Higher Education sector. At the same time,
having raised expectations of transformation, the ministry
found itself pulled towards WCUPs (and indeed much higher
funding for the sector) as part of an attempt to complete that
transformation.
Substantial
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(as opposed to an initiative embedded in general reforms). The Excellence Initiative’s
rationale was to promote the country’s global reputation in research. The Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft’s (DFG [German Research Foundation]) see: (http://www.
excellence-initiative.com/ and http://www.excellence-initiative.com/excellence-
initiative). stated unequivocally:
The Excellence Initiative promotes outstanding research at German universi-
ties. Its objective: world-class science. […] Politics and science joined together
[…] to strengthen cutting-edge research and to make German science and
research more visible in the scientific community. […] to raise the visibility of
German science and research vis-à-vis our [Germany’s] international
competitors. […] the Excellence Initiative pursued a path of inequality and of
funding elites.
Hence, first and foremost additionality was expected to originate from reputational
benefits. The rules of the competition wanted to steer towards bringing more (private)
endogenous resources into the system and decreasing reliance on public funds.
Strategic partnerships were intended, inter alia, to enhance the likelihood of
obtaining private funding, crucial to meet the eligibility requirement of sustainable
institutional action. The Excellence Initiative was intended to stimulate collaboration
between universities, research programmes, and private R&D; German universities
and other public research organizations were both incentivized to form strategic
partnerships (e.g. with the Max Planck Institutes) that were intended to lead to
increased research publications and higher academic reputation. Though not the key
argument for initiating the programme, such developments were also justified in
terms of their system efficiency gains.
Finally, an important aim of the Excellence Initiative was to create ‘new products’
in the form of graduate school trajectories, through the funding track for Graduate
Schools. Although graduate trajectories, in the form of Research Training Groups
funded by the German Research Council, existed in Germany since the late 1980s,6
the Excellence Initiative transforms this tradition through stricter selection at entry
and greater diversity among the schools — which are untraditional avenues in
German academic practice (traditionally doctoral students are university researchers
whose work leads to a doctorate) (Table 4).
Soon after it was launched, there have been calls (e.g. from the Brandenburg
Academy of Sciences, 2009) to assess the Excellence Initiative’s effects on the
system. Although it may be too soon to judge definitively, it has been noted
(see The Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, 2009; Hartmann, 2010; Labi, 2012;
Kehm, 2013) that vertical differentiation of the university system and concentration
of resources increased; that teaching lost ground to research, and that visibility
abroad of German universities improved (attracting more foreign donors and
investments according to Huber, president of Ludwig Maximilian University, quoted
in Labi, 2012).
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Rankings or System Benefits? What Policy Makers Wanted from
WCUPs
As pointed out throughout this paper, an increasingly widespread belief posits
that a limited number of elite universities are key to improving national higher
education systems— the celebrity of the few embracing many more in its ‘shadow’.
Governments of the three European countries explored in this paper recognized
shortcomings in their national higher education systems and decided that some form
of WCUP was necessary to address them and create public benefits. French policy
makers wished to address segmentation and inadequate infrastructures; Aalto was
meant to contribute to rationalizing the Finnish system through mergers, governance
and funding reforms; and Germany’s Excellence Initiative purported to resume the
country’s fading image as a research powerhouse in the face of an increasingly
‘anglo-saxonized’ global higher education landscape.
Table 4 Assessment of intended benefits, Germany
Dimension Description Assessment
Increased exogenous
resources
Germany’s Excellence Initiative is mainly concerned with research
(although an excellence initiative for education has recently
been initiated). It aims at making Germany a more attractive
research location, thus attracting investments and partnerships
from abroad.
Absent
Increased private
endogenous
resources
By including the ‘sustainability’ of candidate projects in the
evaluation criteria, the Excellence Initiative aims at decreasing
over time the reliance on government endowments and at
supporting strategic partnerships and new forms of income-
generating activities.
Limited
Systemic improvements The Excellence Initiative legitimizes otherwise unlikely
institutional reforms (but they were not stated as explicit
programme goals)
Absent
New products Germany’s Excellence Initiative funds universities that establish
graduate schools, supporting a new kind of product in the
traditional German higher education landscape.
Substantial
Reputational benefits When German politics and science joined together in 2005 to
launch the Excellence Initiative, they set themselves a
formidable goal. Their aim was to organize a competition to
sustainably strengthen research at Germany’s universities and
to raise the visibility of German science and research vis-à-vis
our international competitors. These were ambitious goals
indeed, especially since it meant a departure from a long-
cherished— and fatally wrong— conception that all
universities are equal and hence should be treated equally.
Instead, the Excellence Initiative pursued a path of inequality
and of funding elites
Substantial
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Hence, at the level of intentionality policy makers identified systemic problems
but according to our analyses did not seem to consider WCUPs’ fitness for tackling
them. That visibility and system improvements do not ineludibly go hand in glove is
evident from countries that are well represented in the rankings notwithstanding the
absence of WCUPs. For instance, the Netherlands has less-than-average (OECD,
2012b, table B4.1) egalitarian funding for higher education yet shows up with almost
all research universities in the global rankings’ top-200. Governments might claim to
implement excellence initiatives based on objective criteria. Detractors might counter
that they are simply emulating the model most successful in global rankings— large,
science-dominated research universities. As was mentioned earlier in the paper, the
prevailing rhetoric on WCUPs focuses heavily on rankings — today’s most trendy
(and controversial) proxy for institutional reputation— which adopt a limited mix of
indicators overly reliant on research and with primarily private benefits. This creates
a dissonance between reasonable ends (systemic improvement) and deficient means
(improving rankings), which in turn puts into question the potential success of
policies founded on such a false causality. van Vught and Ziegele, 2012, 4) argue that
rankings tend to be presented as if their collection of indicators reflects the
definitive quality of the institution; they have the pretension, in that sense, of being
guided by what is in reality a nonexistent theory of the quality of higher education.
At the same time, one should not underestimate the allure that rankings have on
policy makers all over the world (e.g., see Hazelkorn, 2011). Governments have
increasingly adopted global rankings’ indicators into their own performance
measurements or used rankings to set targets for system restructuring and allocating
funds (e.g. in terms of accountability, transparency, and internationalization poli-
cies). Hence, if well-designed, rankings could have positive impacts both on
government decisions on investment allocations within the system and on institu-
tional improvement— for example in internal strategic decision making (van Vught
and Ziegele, 2012, 77). Thus, the traits of today’s rankings are at least partly to blame
for faulty reform policies.
Rational WCUPs that delivered the system improvements that policy makers
really wanted should not start from league tables that use a very limited set of
indicators. Under these conditions, a WCUP is not an efficient policy instrument for
higher education when viewed from the level of the system (quite the reverse, the
dissonance between ends and means — addressing specific system shortcomings
with WCUPs targeting private rankings— transpires). However, when we look at the
intentionality, WCUPs can be efficient policy instruments for higher education
systems, because they are meant to address specific system problems.
This dilemma must be addressed for instance starting by acknowledging openly
that WCUPs can — and should — differ according to the context wherein they are
embedded and that, hence, a one-size-fits-all rhetoric is ill-founded, if the moneys
spent on WCUPs are to contribute to higher education reforms in different settings.
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Policies for Creating System Improvements
In view of this dissonance it seems that the policies described above lack the
necessary scope to enhance performance, leaving open the question as to what policy
makers should do to target system improvement.
We argue that a more realistic understanding of what is to be achieved, which
agnizes the coherence of the whole system and how policy interventions affect that
system, is necessary. Our contention fits in a long-standing body of theories that
point out that a system is defined by the dynamic interaction between its components,
and that where interaction is wanting there are separate systems (e.g., see von
Bertalanffy, 1950). Indeed, current WCUPs may actually induce additional barriers,
reduce the system-character of higher education, limiting the potential for spill-over,
and hence reduce the public benefits.
For example, promoting excellence in research is expected to improve also
teaching performance and — hence — bridge the teaching–research divide. But, if
research performance alone is targeted a top-tier institution might benefit at the
expense of others (e.g., it might be abetted in enacting necessary management
changes) and the divide in the system might in fact crystallize as feared for example
in Germany (see Kehm and Pasternack, 2009).
Instead of looking at research performance, WCUPs might target — explicitly —
more private investments in research. In reality, policies such as Aalto and the French
initiatives do go in the direction just outlined but remain ‘trapped’ in the ongoing rhetoric
and jargon that are so popular (‘world class’, ‘élite’, ‘accountability’, ‘efficiency’,
‘competitiveness’, etc.). More clarity would raise awareness that world-class universities
can create positive effects on the higher education system only if the initiatives support
the ‘university eco-system’ — a system where differentiation does not translate in the
dominance of one kind of institution at the expense of others but supports dynamic inter-
relations and which is able to absorb the spill-overs (i.e. more exogenous and
endogenous resources, system improvements, new products and better reputation).
Ultimately, we are not arguing that improving in the rankings is per se undesirable,
but that system improvement is the most important object if policy makers wish to be
rational. WCUPs might lead to rankings improvements, but this is incidental — not
fundamental. Pursuing rankings might make sense where arguments other than efficient
government prevail (e.g., international prestige or ‘appearing strong in the world’), which
are often culturally determined and unrelated to educational improvement Therefore, it is
necessary to consider the basket of policies that can induce system improvements,
wherein WCUPs are but one which addresses certain parts of the system.
Notes
1 This is evidenced by the importance policy makers attach to higher ranking positions for their countries’
universities (though to varying degrees). For example, in 2004, discussing the decisions about the second
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round of the Excellence Initiative, the German Minister of Education stated (translation by authors), ‘For
Germany to compete internationally with elite universities like ETH Zürich, Stanford or Oxford we need
lighthouses that are visible from afar’ (cited in Wiarda, 2012). Moreover, according to the ‘Research in
Germany’ portal (which is the central information platform of the initiative to ‘Promote Innovation and
Research in Germany’ by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research), ‘the Excellence Initiative
especially supports measures that make universities internationally successful and carry the promise of
leading positions in international rankings’ (see http://www.research-in-germany.de/main/research-landscape/
29482/research-ranking.html). Similarly, whenever universities drop in international rankings, policy makers
seem to be alarmed and call for action. Like in Finland where, in its ‘Strategy for the Internationalisation of
Higher Education Institutions in Finland 2009–2015’, the Ministry of Education worries that ‘[the Finnish]
ranking in international competitiveness and development of information society comparisons has taken
a downturn. The risk is that Finnish higher education institutions are losing their position as an interesting
cooperation partner’. It is therefore not surprising that the Aalto experiment is often considered driven by the
need for more high-ranking Finnish institutions. Ian Dobson, for instance, in his article in the University
World News (October 2009), suggests that ‘[…] there are hopes the Aalto experiment will lead to Finland
having another high-ranking university […]’. In France, although official statements explicitly linking
WCUPs to rankings (and particularly Shanghai’s Academic Rankings of World Universities (ARWU)) are
well-camouflaged by rhetoric criticising its methodology, it is clear that the ministry is sensitive to the
rankings. For example, in July 2010, higher education and research minister Valérie Pécresse took time
during a visit to China to ‘lobby’ the team responsible for the ARWU, specifically explaining how the PRES
(Centres of Research and Higher Education, see the section ‘France’) mergers of smaller universities would
provide higher quality of research and teaching (see, e.g., Bertherau, 2010). In July 2011, four PRES were
visited by an ARWU delegation at the invitation of the ministry, who stressed that this was intended to
support excellence and the visibility of French universities worldwide. In 2012 Geneviève Fioraso, the new
Research and Higher education minister, was quick to emphasize the new administration’s reluctance to using
the ARWU as a driver of French policy on higher education and research, underlining her support for the
nascent U-Multirank.
2 For example, an important dimension this paper considers is ‘systemic improvement’ (see below), which
covers, inter alia, the question of how comprehensive the higher education provision is (e.g. the mergers
in Finland were meant also to create critical mass to cater for more students).
3 For more detailed information, see Aalto’s Annual Board Report and Financial Statements, at: http://
www.aalto.fi/en/about/reports_and_statistics/auf_toimintakertomus_ja_tilinpaatos_en_a4_2.pdf.
4 Interestingly, the focus on direct revenues is underplayed in this statement, suggesting that reputation is
the main drive of the whole endeavour, at least for insiders.
5 Stifterverband (literally ‘Donor’s Association’) is the business community’s innovation agency
for the German science system. See: http://www.stifterverband.info/ueber_den_stifterverband/english/
index.html.
6 Research Training Groups are constructed as temporary research units at universities (4.5 to 9 years max)
and mainly aim at improving the integration of doctoral students into collaborative research. Doctoral
students and professors jointly work on an overarching, often interdisciplinary research programme and
each single dissertation is regarded as an element contributing to this overarching programme. They also
offer a study programme providing training in different topics in line with the research programme. They
include a (interdisciplinary) team of supervisors instead of a single supervisor, and are based on
competitive access (see Kottmann, 2012).
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